

The President's Daily Brief

9 November 1972

45

~~Top Secret~~

25X1

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

9 November 1972

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

25X1

[REDACTED]

Hanoi appears to be sending a fresh armor regiment and two field artillery regiments into northern South Vietnam. (Page 1)

25X1


Pakistan is taking a number of diplomatic moves favorable to Asian Communist regimes. These steps may reflect President Bhutto's dissatisfaction with certain aspects of his relations with the US. (Page 3)

The Argentine Government appears to be preparing for the return of former dictator Juan Peron. (Page 4)

Uganda's deadline for the departure of non-citizen Asians passed yesterday without major incidents, and most of those required to leave have been evacuated. (Page 5)

At Annex, we examine the confusing domestic political scene that has prevailed in China since the purge of Lin Piao one year ago.


FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY



25X1

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

VIETNAM




25X1



25X1



25X1



25X1

* * *

Hanoi appears to be sending a fresh armor regiment and two field artillery regiments into northern South Vietnam. Recent North Vietnamese messages, as well as aerial photography and US pilot sightings, have disclosed large numbers of tanks, tracked vehicles, and convoys of artillery moving through the panhandle toward the Demilitarized Zone. One intercept disclosed that 92 tanks had moved through the Vinh area, and other units farther south have reported the passage of three groups of tanks that could be an armor regiment. A message of 5 November from the major enemy logistics authority in northern Quang Tri Province noted that "two ground artillery regiments..." equipped with tracked vehicles and 120 trucks were to move along Route 9 in Quang Tri Province.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

CHINA

It has been a year since the purge of Lin Piao. The ruling politburo has still not been reconstituted by replacement of those military members who went down with Lin. Leadership turnouts and authoritative policy pronouncements have been rare.

Despite the outward appearance of order in China, tensions clearly persist among the surviving leaders. This is evidently recognized by many low- and middle-level party members in China.

Moreover, the protracted campaign throughout the country to repudiate Lin Piao and the absence from view of an increasing number of provincial military leaders suggest that military powerholders in the provinces are under pressure. This involves real risks for domestic political order.

At Annex we examine the confusing domestic political scene in greater detail.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

PAKISTAN

The Bhutto government is taking a number of diplomatic moves favorable to Asian Communist regimes. Yesterday, Islamabad began its formal withdrawal from SEATO. On Tuesday, it recognized Hanoi, and it intends to recognize Pyongyang today. Moreover, Islamabad's next step may be early recognition of Sihanouk's "Royal Government of National Union."

There appear to be several factors behind these moves. Bhutto wants to increase Pakistan's contacts with other Asian nations, he wishes to ingratiate himself further with Peking, and he needs to counter criticism by leftists at home that his policy is too pro-American.

25X1

A growing dissatisfaction with US policy could also be involved. [REDACTED]

25X1

[REDACTED]

25X1

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

ARGENTINA

On Tuesday Hector Campora, Peron's personal representative in Argentina, announced that the 77-year-old former dictator would return to his homeland on 17 November. Within a few hours President Lanusse told the nation that the armed forces would guarantee Peron's personal safety and deal with any threats to domestic peace by either Peronists or their opponents.

Peron has said before that he would return, and this announcement may be only another attempt to throw the opposition off balance and to pressure Lanusse into agreeing to his demands on Peronist participation in political activity. It seems more likely, however, that this time Peron recognizes that he must return or face a serious loss of prestige.

If Peron does return he may well stay for only a few days, long enough to endorse an electoral accord with the military. The short lead time on Campora's announcement and the tenor of Lanusse's speech suggest that the Peronists and the government are close to an agreement on the conduct of the national elections next March and on the orientation of the government that will take office in May.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

NOTE

Uganda: President Amin's deadline for the departure of non-citizen Asians passed yesterday without major incidents, and most of those required to leave have been evacuated. Some 1,500 stateless Asians remain, however, along with a few thousand Asians with Ugandan citizenship and those exempted because of their much-needed technical skills. The UN has set up departure centers in Kampala for the remaining stateless Asians and will try to move them to facilities in Europe and elsewhere by the end of the week.

CHINESE COMMUNIST POLITBURO (Elected April 1969)

STANDING COMMITTEE

Mao Tse-tung (78)
Chairman, Central Committee

~~Lin Piao (64)
Vice Chairman, Central Committee; Defense Minister~~

Chou En-lai (73)
Premier

~~Ch'en Po-ta (66)
Chairman, Cultural Revolution Group~~

K'ang Sheng (72)
Adviser, Cultural Revolution Group, Internal Security Chief

WIVES

Chiang Ch'ing (56)
Wife of Mao; First Deputy Head, Cultural Revolution Group

~~Yeh Ch'un (44)
Wife of Lin Piao; Military Affairs Committee~~

MILITARY LEADERS

~~Huang Yung-sheng (62)
Chief of Staff; Military Affairs Committee~~

~~Ch'iu Hui-tso (56)
Deputy Chief of Staff; Army Logistics Chief; Military Affairs Committee~~

Li Tso-p'eng (60)
~~Deputy Chief of Staff; Political Commissar, Navy; Military Affairs Committee~~

Wu Fa-hsien (58)
~~Deputy Chief of Staff; Commander, Air Force; Military Affairs Committee~~

Yeh Chien-ying (72)
Vice Chairman, Military Affairs Committee

PROVINCIAL LEADERS

Chi Teng-k'uei (40)*
Vice Chairman, Honan Provincial Revolutionary Committee

Ch'en Hsi-lien (60)
Commander, Shen-yang Military Region; Chairman, Liaoning Provincial Revolutionary Committee

~~Li Hsueh-feng (64)*
Chairman, Hopei Provincial Revolutionary Committee~~

Chang Ch'un-ch'iao (59)
Chairman, Shanghai Municipal Revolutionary Committee; Second Deputy Head, Cultural Revolution Group

Li Te-sheng (61)*
Commander, Anhwei Military District; Chairman, Anhwei Provincial Revolutionary Committee

Hsu Shih-yu (64)
Vice Minister of Defense; Commander, Nanking Military Region; Chairman, Kiangsu Provincial Revolutionary Committee

Yao Wen-yuan (36)
Vice Chairman, Shanghai Municipal Revolutionary Committee; Member, Cultural Revolution Group

GOVERNMENT LEADERS

~~Hsieh Fu-chih (69)
Public Security Minister; Chairman, Peking Municipal Revolutionary Committee; Vice Premier~~

Li Hsien-nien (66)
Finance Minister

Wang Tung-hsing (age unknown)*
Public Security Vice Minister; Director, General Office, Party Central Committee

HONORARY ELDERS

~~Chu Te (85)
Chairman, National People's Congress~~

~~Liu Po-ch'eng (79)
Vice Chairman, National People's Congress; Military Affairs Committee~~

~~Tung Pi-wu (85)
Vice Chairman, People's Republic of China~~

*Alternate Members

~~Inactive~~

~~Purged or dead~~

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

DOMESTIC POLITICS, CHINESE STYLE

The events of last autumn drastically altered the political edifice in Peking, but the surviving leaders have, at least up to now, managed the crisis well. Basic social order has been maintained. The military has remained stable while being urged by the regime to be subordinate to civilian party control. The trend toward moderation in domestic policies--a trend evident since 1969, and one that has wide popular support--has been even more pronounced since Lin's departure from the scene. In the conduct of foreign affairs, Peking has scored a succession of triumphs in 1972, the fruition of its decision several years ago to adopt a more pragmatic and outgoing foreign policy.

Nevertheless, the domestic political difficulties faced by Peking are major ones, and the leadership has thus far reacted with extreme caution. Peking's problems are most evident within the politburo itself; only 16 of the original 25 members named in 1969 are still being mentioned in the official press by name, and of these only a dozen appear to be participating in the affairs of state in a meaningful way. The delay in reconstituting the politburo is doubtless associated with the question of the military's future representation on that body. While the regime wrestles with this problem, the armed forces are without a designated leader. Marshal Yeh Chien-ying has been serving as de facto defense minister but has not been formally appointed to the position.

The Issues

Because Lin was officially designated Mao's successor, Peking also faces a major task of working out a new formula for succession. For several years, Peking has delayed convening the National People's Congress, the state forum for legitimizing institutional and personnel changes. Presumably this delay has stemmed from disputes within the leadership, and among these issues has been the wisdom and utility of many of the changes wrought by the Cultural Revolution. The idea of a post-Mao "collective leadership" has persistently surfaced in the past year; it is likely that it is the mix of this collective, rather than the principle itself, that is now at issue.

The regime's handling of the Lin affair has made it appear that the central issue in Peking is one of civilian versus military control. In fact, the issue is much more complex. Evidence--some of it antedating Lin's demise--indicates the institutional problem is a real one. Nevertheless, the

A1

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

leadership is deeply divided on a much wider range of policy and personnel questions. Moreover, developments during the Cultural Revolution clearly created and intensified antipathies between leaders who were identified with its excesses and those of a more moderate persuasion. It is hard to believe these antipathies have now vanished, or that they no longer cut across institutions and interest groups, including the armed forces.

Some Anomalies

The actual facts surrounding the demise of Lin Piao in September 1971 may never be known. Most of those at politburo level who were purged with Lin had long been associated with him and were clearly identified with the excesses of the Cultural Revolution. In fact, however, the affair claimed high-level military victims at both ends of the political spectrum. Moreover, a campaign against ultra-leftists--which began in late 1969, evidently under the direction of Chou En-lai--has been muted if not terminated altogether, even though it has not reached all of its potential victims. Chiang Ching, deputy head of the Cultural Revolution Group which directed Mao's purge of the old party apparatus, seemingly should have been the next target, but as Mao's wife she apparently is immune. Two other prominent leftists, Shanghai party leaders Chang Chun-chiao and Yao Wen-yuan, also continue to appear frequently in Peking.

In contrast to these inconsistencies in personnel matters, China appears at present to be traveling on a single policy track. Rationality and pragmatism seem to be the order of the day, not only in foreign policy but also in domestic areas dear to Mao's heart, such as education. There are no convincing signs that this approach is being opposed or debated at the moment.

One element that almost certainly is raising political temperatures is the protracted effort to repudiate Lin Piao. The notion that Lin, the defense minister and Mao's designated successor, could turn against his mentor has sharply eroded confidence in the country's leadership, not only among party officials but among the populace at large. Since early this year, cadres have been studying a succession of documents purporting to spell out the details of Lin's coup plot. The key item in this series, the so-called "571 document," contains Lin's purported operations plan. The plan lists not only those forces that Lin allegedly could count on for support--primarily the air force--but also a number of other military units he supposedly was attempting to enlist in the plot. The implication is that there



FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

still are elements within the armed forces whose loyalty is questionable. The most ominous sign in this connection is the latest available document in the anti-Lin series, issued in early July, which suggests that the central authorities will not in the future need written evidence of complicity in the Lin "conspiracy" in order to move against given individuals.

Problems in the Provinces

Some members of the leadership may in fact be exploiting the Lin affair in order to move against military powerholders in the provinces. This impression has been reinforced in recent weeks by the failure of an increasing number of these leaders to make public appearances [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

A move against provincial military leaders, even on a selective basis, risks jeopardizing domestic political order. The Cultural Revolution destroyed the leadership of the old party and government bureaucracies, leaving the military as the only effective instrument of control. Some efforts have been made to re-establish the civilian party structure and reassert its traditional leading role in the Chinese polity. It is clear, however, that military leaders still hold the balance of power in the party apparatus outside of Peking. Thus a move against these military leaders, particularly if it is widespread, could cause a breakdown in control, with no alternative mechanism available to fill the void.

25X1

The continuing denunciation of Lin and the accompanying "rectification" movement within the party and the army seem to have Mao's consent. [redacted]

25X1

[redacted] Mao may see the campaign as an opportunity to settle personal scores with a number of provincial military leaders, primarily those whose opposition to the Red Guard movement led him to close out the Cultural Revolution before he felt he had accomplished all of his objectives.

25X1

On the other hand, Mao must recognize that his close personal identification with Lin renders him vulnerable in certain important ways. The 571 document contains some unusually harsh words about Mao's leadership. In effect, it accuses Mao of the excesses of the Cultural Revolution, characterizing him as a "cruel tyrant." This attack on the Chairman is attributed to Lin, and it has been circulated

A3

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

with Mao's explicit approval, but the effect has been to give wide publicity to a list of grievances against Mao with which most of the populace can readily identify.

Mao and Chou

During 1972, Mao and Chou have seemed to work very closely on most matters. Chou has constantly been at Mao's side during the Chairman's meetings with visiting state leaders, and in the course of the detailed negotiations with foreign powers, Chou has made it clear that he always defers to Mao on broad policy matters. Similarly, Mao has on several occasions publicly acknowledged his confidence in Chou.

25X1

25X1

Provincial leaders are not now faced, either collectively or individually, with the massive public attacks and orchestrated violence that were so provocative in the 1967-68 period. In the absence of such a direct challenge--and Peking has gone to some lengths to indicate that such a challenge is not forthcoming--it is unlikely that they could or would unite to defy the authority of the Chairman directly. This seems particularly to be the case in the absence of a strong and authoritative leader for such a move.

It is difficult to cast Chou in such a role. His concern for the loyalty of the armed forces to the political system is surely as great as his concern for the cohesion of the military establishment, and on both grounds he is likely to attempt to "limit the damage" rather than place himself at the head of a group determined to end the selective purge of the military by open defiance of Mao. Today Chou seems to have the endorsement of the Chairman for much of his domestic program as well as for his foreign policy, and this is an asset he will not cast away lightly. Thus, a Mao-Chou split seems highly improbable now.

Mao's motives in the present situation are equally complicated. Certainly vindictiveness and a desire to settle old scores play a major part in the current moves against the provincial military. But the explicit attempts to reassure the military

A4

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

that it is not about to suffer a thoroughgoing "rectification," coupled with continued emphasis on relatively conservative and pragmatic policies at home as well as abroad, seem to indicate that the Chairman's offensive is at this point a limited one. Like Chou, he seems intent for the moment to limit the damage. His objective could well be to establish a better balance between competing leftist and conservative forces--and hence further increase his own freedom of maneuver--by whittling away at the predominantly conservative military leaders in the provinces through a process of linking them, however tenuously, to the Lin "plot."

To create this better balance, Mao may eventually do more than merely whittle away. Most recent appointments have involved relatively conservative persons who were under attack during the Cultural Revolution, but two others do not fall into this category. These latter appointments suggest at least the possibility of a leftward swing in the political pendulum. Whatever the case, it is clear that further changes are in prospect and that tensions will persist for some time within the leadership.

A5

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

Top Secret